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Historical evidence indicates that hyperinflations can disrupt indi- 
viduals' normal trading patterns and impede the orderly functioning 
of markets. To explore these issues, we construct a theoretical model 
of hyperinflation that focuses on individuals and their process of 
economic exchange. In our model buyers must carry cash while 
shopping, and some transactions take place in a decentralized setting 
in which buyer and seller negotiate over the terms of trade of an 
indivisible good. Since buyers face the constant threat of incoming 
younger (hence richer) customers, their bargaining position is weak- 
ened by inflation, allowing sellers to extract a higher real price. How- 
ever, we show that higher inflation also reduces buyers' search, 
increasing sellers' wait for customers. As a result, the volume 
of transactions concluded in the decentralized sector falls. At high 
enough rates of inflation, all agents suffer a welfare loss. 
I. Introduction 
Since. Cagan (1956), economic analyses of hyperinflations have fo- 
cused attention on aggregate time-series data, especially exploding 
price levels and money stocks, lost output, and depreciating exchange 
rates. Work on the German hyperinflation of the twenties provides a 
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good example of this approach; see, among others, the econometric 
studies of money demand by Sargent and Wallace (1973), Frenkel 
(1977), Salemi and Sargent (1979), and Christiano (1987) and the 
tests for speculative price bubbles presented by Flood and Garber 
(1980), Burmeister and Wall (1982, 1987), and Casella (1989). 
If we compare these studies with historical accounts of the German 
experience, the difference in focus is striking. Whereas economists 
concentrate on aggregate performance measures, historians empha- 
size the hyperinflation's disruptive impact on individuals and on their 
socioeconomic relationships. Previously stable trading connections 
were severed, transactions patterns were altered, and normally well- 
functioning markets collapsed (see Feldman 1977, 1989; Feldman et 
al. 1984; Kunz 1986; Moeller 1986). 
In this paper we present an attempt to bridge the gap between the 
historical literature and economic analysis. We construct a formal 
economic model of hyperinflation that centers on individual trading 
patterns and on the exchange process, and we explore the implica- 
tions of this model for relative prices, market structure, and social 
welfare. Our results are consistent with historical evidence, but our 
model naturally addresses only a small part of a larger set of issues. 
Our main purpose is to show, by example, the usefulness of reex- 
amining hyperinflations at a more detailed analytic level. 
Our approach depends on two main assumptions, both of which 
have been motivated by our reading of life experiences during the 
German inflation. First, we assume that domestic money is required 
for all transactions. Two pieces of evidence support this assumption: 
the legal restriction that prohibited the holding of foreign currencies 
and the general unwillingness to resort to barter up until the very last 
months prior to stabilization. 
Second, we construct our model so as to emphasize time and the 
importance of converting depreciating nominal accounts into real 
goods as quickly as possible. Many anecdotes reveal how important 
time became during the German inflation: 
Almost daily at the ten o'clock break I used to see the 
teachers trooping down into the [school's] playground 
where their friends and relatives were waiting, into whose 
hands they thrust the money that they'd just received so 
that it could be spent before the prices went up. [Dorothy 
Haenkel in Guttmann and Meehan (1975, p. 80)] 
At eleven o'clock in the morning a siren sounded and 
everybody gathered in the factory forecourt where a five- 
ton lorry was drawn up loaded brimful with paper money. 
The chief cashier and his assistants climbed up on top. 
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They read out names and just threw out bundles of notes. 
As soon as you had caught one you made a dash for the 
nearest shop and bought just anything that was going. 
[Willy Derkow in Guttmann and Meehan (1975, pp. 57- 
58)] 
We incorporate these two assumptions into a simple model of an 
economy populated by overlapping generations of agents and consist- 
ing of two sectors labeled red and blue. We focus mainly on the red 
sector, which is a decentralized market in which buyers must search 
for an available seller. When a buyer and seller meet, they bargain 
over the terms of trade of the indivisible red good, and we model this 
bargaining as a modified version of Rubinstein's (1982) game. As we 
shall see, the buyer's need to convert money into the red good as 
quickly as possible strongly affects the outcome of the bargain and has 
further repercussions on search behavior and red market structure. 
The blue sector, in contrast to the red, is centralized, consisting of a 
perfectly competitive market in which all sellers charge the same equi- 
librium price for the blue good. In accordance with our first assump- 
tion above, all transactions on both markets require cash. Finally, 
additional money is injected into the economy each period; hence 
nominal prices are rising on both markets. 
Our analysis of this model explores three issues, in each case lead- 
ing to results that seem consistent with available evidence. The first 
issue is the effect of inflation on relative prices and relative incomes. 
A buyer in the decentralized sector must carry cash while searching 
for an available seller and negotiating the terms of trade. Hence he 
faces the continual depreciation of his real money holdings and, most 
important, the pressing competition of new buyers, who enter the 
market with increasing amounts of nominal money. The buyer's 
weakening position over time stands in sharp contrast to the stable 
position of the seller, who is able to hold his nondepreciating good 
until successfully completing a transaction. This asymmetry between 
the two agents translates into an increase in the bargaining power of 
the seller and a redistribution of the trading surplus in his favor: the 
relative price of the good sold in the decentralized sector and the 
seller's real income are higher the higher is the economy's inflation 
rate. This conclusion appears to capture, and rationalize, anecdotal 
evidence: "The frantic urge to buy, combined with the reluctance of 
producers and owners of goods to sell for depreciating marks, natu- 
rally drove prices up" (Guttmann and Meehan 1975, p. 29). 
The second issue we explore is the impact of inflation on agents' 
welfare. In accordance with the partial equilibrium intuition dis- 
cussed above, we find that sellers in the decentralized sector benefit 
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from increased inflation over a wide range of inflation rates, while 
buyers suffer. Hence in our model there is no inflation rate that is 
unequivocally Pareto dominant, excluding lump-sum transfers. How- 
ever, we also find that at sufficiently high inflation rates, both buyers' 
and sellers' expected utilities fall. The intuition is simple: the buyers 
will continue their search as long as they have a positive probability of 
engaging in a successful transaction. But inflation is eroding their real 
balances, and eventually they might become so "poor" that no seller 
could be induced to consider them as potential customers. At this 
point, they would leave the market. At higher inflation rates the num- 
ber of periods allowed for search will be lower, and the average num- 
ber of buyers per store smaller. This will in turn negatively affect the 
sellers, who will have to wait longer before being contacted by a suit- 
able customer. In a sense, sellers suffer from a lack of coordination; 
each individually prefers not to talk to "older" buyers and disregards 
the impact of his decision on the group as a whole. Again, this result 
appears to coincide with available evidence: "Shops remained empty, 
and their suppliers, unable for this reason to get rid of their wares, 
reduced production" (Guttmann and Meehan 1975, p. 75). 
Finally, we calculate the velocity of circulation of money in the 
economy. At higher inflation rates, as buyers leave the decentralized 
market at earlier dates, the average time during which they hold 
currency is shortened, and the velocity of circulation is increased. Any 
new injection of money will then have a larger effect on the price 
level. This is, of course, the traditional assumption of hyperinflation 
models, here derived endogenously. 
Our results bear comparison with the large and diverse literature 
on inflation and, more specifically, with previous analyses studying 
the effect of inflation on trade, when money is required for transac- 
tions. Originating with Friedman (1969), this literature sees inflation 
as a distortionary tax on money balances. In a world in which lump- 
sum taxes are available, the optimal rate of nominal price increase 
equals the negative of the real interest rate: the cost of holding money 
is then equalized to the social cost of supplying money, that is, to zero. 
Bewley (1980) and Townsend (1980) prove formally that if agents are 
infinitely lived and have a common discount rate, the required price 
deflation entails an infinite money stock. Government intervention in 
the form of lump-sum taxes on money is necessary for Friedman's 
result. The initial intuition is applied to more complex models by 
Jovanovic (1982), Rotemberg (1984), and Romer (1986), among 
others, without altering the conclusion. Lucas and Stokey (1983) and 
Lucas (1986) enrich the framework to a world in which some goods 
are purchased with money and others with credit. Here inflation dis- 
torts society's allocation of resources away from the cash-in-advance 
sector by changing the relative cost of the two goods, and Friedman's 
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rule is again optimal. In our model, all transactions require cash and 
Friedman's result does not hold. However, the logic of these latter 
works does carry over to our economy, in a modified form: when 
economic sectors differ in their exchange technologies, inflation may 
affect them differently, distorting relative prices. The papers by 
Lucas and by Lucas and Stokey and our analysis are all examples of 
this general effect. 
Finally, the model presented here represents a natural extension of 
the work of Diamond (1982, 1984) and Diamond and Yellin (1984, 
1985), who study search and decentralized exchange. The important 
difference is the introduction of strategic bargaining as a way to de- 
termine how the surplus from trade will be shared. Given inflation 
and the cash-in-advance constraint, this feature endogenizes the max- 
imum number of periods allowed for search. It is then possible to 
follow, in a relatively simple way, the distribution of money holdings 
in the economy and therefore to completely characterize the general 
equilibrium solution, even in the presence of inflation. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the model. 
Then Sections III-VII analyze the simplest cases of the model. Sec- 
tion III explicitly derives the solution of the bargaining game for 
specific ranges of inflation rates that lead to a simplified analysis; 
Section IV describes in detail the matching process through which 
buyers and sellers meet; Section V derives the inflation rate, as a 
function of the increase in the money supply and the (endogenous) 
circulation of agents in the economy; and Sections VI and VII charac- 
terize the complete solution of the model. Finally, Section VIII ex- 
tends the previous results to the general case, and Section IX presents 
conclusions. 
II. The Model 
The economy is composed of two sectors. In the blue market a divis- 
ible good is sold competitively: this market is centralized, and equilib- 
rium prices are posted and adhered to by all traders. In contrast, in 
the red market the exchange of a storable, indivisible commodity is 
decentralized: individual buyers and sellers bargain over terms of 
trade prior to transaction. 
There is no production, and each period nb blue agents and nr red 
agents are born with an endowment of one unit of their respective 
good. Their utility functions are 
Ur = aqb, 
- f 
5qb if the red good has been purchased 
Ub l aqb - A otherwise, 
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where 8 (< 1) is the common discount factor, qb is the consumption of 
the blue good, and s is the number of periods since birth when this 
consumption takes place. 
Everybody desires the blue good, while the red good is valued by 
only the blue consumers, who suffer a large disutility, A, if they are 
unable to purchase it. We assume that A is large enough to make 
them willing to pay any feasible price for the red commodity and to 
remain in the red market as long as there is any positive probability of 
a successful transaction. 1 
Agents exit the economy after consumption; hence the model is a 
modified overlapping generations framework in which the number of 
periods till death is endogenous. 
Transactions in the red market are characterized by a matching 
process, through which traders meet, and a bargaining game. We 
assume that identical red sellers sit in their stores waiting for blue 
buyers who choose randomly and independently where to shop. 
When customers enter a store, the seller decides which of them, if 
any, he wants to address and starts bargaining with him over the price 
of the red good. Since buyers choose the stores independently, each 
has a positive probability of not being alone and of not being selected 
by the seller. If this occurs, the neglected customer can either wait, 
look for another store, or leave the red market altogether.2 
The bargaining is described by a modification of Rubinstein's origi- 
nal game with complete information. The buyer and the red seller 
negotiate over the terms of trade of the red (indivisible) good. The 
negotiation proceeds in a series of offers and counteroffers; the seller 
quotes the first price, and the buyer can accept it or reject it. If he 
rejects it, he makes a counteroffer. Whenever the red seller moves, he 
has three options: he can continue to bargain with the original buyer, 
choose a new customer (if a new customer shows up), or refuse to 
make his offer and end the current bargaining even if no agreement 
has been reached and no new customer has arrived.3 
1 A possible extension of the model would be to see how the equilibrium solution 
reacts to changes in A. As the probability of engaging in a successful transaction in the 
red market becomes small, for certain values of A it might be optimal for a blue 
consumer, ceteris paribus, to avoid the effort of trying to purchase the red good. As 
this is true for all-identical-blue agents, the probability of success in the red market 
goes to one. Hence, equilibrium requires a mixed strategy. 
2 We might imagine that if more than one buyer arrived at his store, the seller could 
hold an auction, selling the good for the highest price. If the auction is sealed-bid, he 
will extract (i) all the income of one member of the youngest generation of buyers 
present if more than one such buyer arrives or (ii) a price equal to the income of the 
second-youngest buyer. Our bargaining model continues to apply when only one buyer 
shows up (which occurs with positive probability), with an appropriate modification of 
the expected off-equilibrium price. 
3 Both these possibilities are available but irrelevant in Rubinstein's original game 
with identical players. In our model, inflation creates differences between the buyers 
and therefore lends importance to these otherwise negligible moves. 
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It is assumed that goods can be bought only with money. There is 
no credit system, and a cash-in-advance constraint forces consumers 
to hold their nominal balances while shopping. In fact, agents' endow- 
ments are such that a nonmonetary barter equilibrium could be sup- 
ported; hence we must assume the transactions role of money, rather 
than derive it endogenously as in classic overlapping generations 
models. 
A source of money, and inflation, is a supposedly benign govern- 
ment agency, called "the bank," whose sole activity is to multiply the 
money holdings of its clients and therefore the money circulating in 
the economy. For simplicity, we assume that the blue consumers go to 
the bank on the way to the red market, but any other configuration 
(i.e., both red and blue, or only the red, go to the bank) would leave 
the substance of our analysis unaffected. Indeed, the same results 
could be obtained by having the government directly buying blue 
goods with newly printed money or by making any assumption that 
would capture the progressive increase in the nominal money hold- 
ings of successive generations. The nominal price on the blue market, 
Pbt, goes up steadily because the same total endowment is traded each 
period for an always increasing money stock. 
In equilibrium, the life of a blue consumer is described by the 
following succession of moves. At time t, he is born with one unit of 
the blue good, which he immediately sells on the competitive market, 
earning the nominal price Pbt. At time t + 1, he goes to the red market 
and, on the way, stops at the bank, where his money holdings are 
increased by a factor of (x. With OtOPbt in cash, he enters a red seller's 
store and, if chosen, starts bargaining. At time t + 2, if the bargaining 
has been successful, he returns to the blue market, where he spends 
all his remaining money. If he was not chosen by the red seller in 
period t + 1, he goes to another red store. The blue's search for a 
willing seller continues until either he succeeds in buying the red 
good or his money holdings have so depreciated that no seller would 
trade with him. In all cases, his final move is to spend all the money he 
has left in the blue market. 
As for the red consumer, at time t he is born with one indivisible 
red good and stays in his store waiting for a customer. If a single 
buyer enters, the seller makes him an offer, unless he considers him 
too poor. If more than one buyer enters the store, he addresses the 
one who can afford to spend the most or, if all are identical, he 
chooses one randomly (unless all are too poor). At time t + 1, if he 
made an offer to a buyer at time t, the transaction is completed (in 
equilibrium) and he goes to the blue market to spend the proceeds. 
Otherwise he again waits for a suitable customer: he has to remain in 
his store as long as needed to sell his good and earn the money that he 
will finally spend in the blue market. 
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As we shall see, the economy is completely characterized by three 
fundamental parameters: 8, the discount rate; nb/nr, the ratio of blue 
to red consumers born each period; and coo, the multiplicative factor 
describing the intervention of the bank. In the following sections, we 
compute steady-state equilibria, as functions of these parameters, and 
compare relative prices and expected utilities. 
III. The Bargaining Game 
With inflation eroding the real value of his money holdings, a blue 
buyer cannot continue to search indefinitely for a well-disposed seller 
in the red market: if he has been unsuccessful (has not been chosen by 
any of the sellers he has approached) for too long, his real wealth 
might have become so low that any seller would rather wait for future 
potential customers than bargain with him, even if he is the only cus- 
tomer in the store. 
Of course, the critical number of periods allowed for search de- 
pends on the inflation rate, and we can define different "regimes" as 
ranges of inflation rates corresponding to a specific number of pe- 
riods that can at most be devoted to search. Within each of these 
regimes, the red seller is willing to bargain only with customers whose 
"age" in the market is below that critical threshold.4 
To keep the exposition simple and the equations tractable, we start 
by concentrating on a specific example: a range of inflation rates such 
that the red sellers are willing to bargain at most with buyers who have 
just arrived in the market (young) or have gone through a single 
unlucky search (old). We call this the two-generation regime. We then 
explicitly derive the equilibrium results and study the transition to the 
one-generation regime, with its welfare implications. The final section 
of the paper presents the solution for the general case. 
Bargaining Equilibrium: The Two-Generation Regime 
The bargaining game is complicated by the presence in the market of 
buyers of different ages and by the uncertainty created by the match- 
ing process. When a buyer enters a store, neither he nor the seller 
knows whether any new customer, young or old, will arrive in the 
near future. In addition, the original buyer himself can be either 
young or old. 
The simplifying feature of the game is its preserved stationarity: 
nothing is modified over time, and the value of bargaining with a 
4 In the model we discuss, the length of the time unit, the bargaining period, is 
exogenous and fixed. A nontrivial improvement would be to have it determined endog- 
enously. In that case, it would clearly be affected by the inflation rate, with seller and 
buyer presumably having contrasting objectives. 
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specific buyer (young or old) is the same in any period. It is this 
fundamental property that characterizes the game. 
A few observations will help us derive the solution. 
1. Since the seller is not willing to bargain with buyers who have 
been in the market more than two periods (very old), he will always 
stop negotiating with the original customer if no agreement has been 
reached before period 3. However, he has to give the customer the 
right to a counteroffer in period 2, regardless of his age or of the 
possible flow of competing buyers. 
2. In period 3, the seller will switch to a young buyer, if one enters 
the store, or to an old buyer, if at least one arrives and no young 
buyers are present at the time (see the proof in Casella and Feinstein 
[1987]). If nobody enters the store, the seller will wait. Therefore, the 
ex ante value of the game to the seller in period 3 in the two- 
generation regime, x2, is 
X2 = Vy2Py2 + Vo2Po2 + V,28X2, (1) 
where vi2 is the probability of addressing a customer of type i (i = y, o) 
in the two-generation regime, vn2 is the probability of having no new 
customers, and Pz2 is the real price of the good when sold to a cus- 
tomer of type i. 
3. Let us define as I, the real money balances of a buyer of type i in 
period 1 and as r the rate of nominal price increase, per period, in 
the blue market (which will later be determined endogenously). When 
we exploit stationarity, the sequence of alternating offers that would 
take place off equilibrium, and that determines the equilibrium price, 
can be analyzed in the elegant diagram proposed by Sutton (1986). 
Period Offer Sequence Seller's Share Buyer's Share 
1 Seller to buyer min{I,, I, - 8[(I/t) -X2]} max{8[(I/o) - X2], } 
2 Buyer to seller 8X2 max[(Iz/ot) - 8x2, 0] 
3 Seller to buyer x2 
Since the value of the game to the seller in period 3 is x2, if no 
agreement had been reached in the first period, the buyer, moving at 
time 2, should offer at least 8x2, keeping for himself (Iih/o) - 8x2, if 
positive, or zero (where (x 1 + r). Anticipating this, the seller in 
period 1 will quote as a price Ii - 8[(IzI/o) - 8x2], if less than Ii, or Ii, 
leaving to the buyer 8[(Ih/ot) - x2] or zero. This characterizes a per- 
fect equilibrium in which trade takes place in the first period and 
Pi2 = min Ii(I - ,) + 82X2J, (2) 
where x2 is defined by equation (1) and t =1 + r. 
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Equations (2) and (1) establish that this price is nondecreasing in in- 
flation. As expected, the combination of inflation with a cash-in- 
advance constraint weakens the bargaining position of the buyer. In 
addition, since we know that Iy = cJ,, (by the definition of young and 
old), equation (2) implies that the young buyers always pay a higher 
price than the old, justifying the preference of the seller, but a smaller 
share of their wealth. As expected, successful search has a positive 
payoff. 
The condition that restricts the seller to bargaining with only two 
generations of buyers determines the range of inflation rates underly- 
ing the equilibrium described by equations (1) and (2). It must be true 
that if every other store sells to young and old customers, it is not 
profitable for a single seller to deviate and either expand his trade to 
the very old or restrict it to only the young. This implies 
Pvo2 ? 8X2, (3) 
Po2 2 8X1, (4) 
where 8x2 is, as before, the value to the seller of waiting another 
period, when his only customer is a very old buyer and the seller 
contemplates bargaining with young and old only. Similarly, 8xI is the 
value of waiting when the one available buyer is old and the seller has 
the alternative of addressing only young customers. 
The very old buyer would rather exchange his whole money hold- 
ings for the red good than abandon the hope of purchasing it and 
incur a large disutility. Therefore, the two-generation regime can be 
an equilibrium only if 
Ivo -- X2, (5) 
with equation (5) holding with equality at the inflation rate at which 
the transition to the two-generation regime takes place. Recalling that 
IVo = IO/a and 
Po2 = min[ ( IoI(i-a) + 2 X2J (2') 
and substituting (5) in (2'), we conclude that 
Po2 = Io (6) 
The lower bound of the range of inflation rates for which the two- 
generation regime is an equilibrium is exactly the rate at which, in the 
present regime, the seller will extract the whole surplus from the old 
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buyers (1rr).5 Taking this into account, we can obtain the equation 
defining I0 from (1) and (2): r0 solves: 
Vy2 ( + MT)2 + (1 + 0U) (v,2 -Vy2) 
-V + v2y21 - + 1 ]=0. (7) 
Equation (4) will give us the upper bound of the relevant range of 
inflation rates. When one seller deviates and trades with young cus- 
tomers only, the ex ante value of the bargaining game from his point 
of view is 
xI = Vy2Py + (1 - vy2)AxI, (8) 
and, when we repeat once more the usual logical steps, the price set to 
the young buyers is 
py= min[IyIy(i - i) + 82x1 (9) 
which implies 
Xl = mintly 1 -8 ( -Vy2) ' IY l -8(I -Vy2) j (Vy21 
Substituting (10) and (6) in (4), we get 
c 1 - 8 (11) 
8Vy2 
Equation (11) defines the highest inflation rate consistent with the 
two-generation equilibrium. (Substitution of [11] in [7] confirms that 
it is above T0.) Note that this rate is also exactly equal to nTy, the infla- 
tion at which the young buyers pay their whole monetary wealth for 
the red good. In fact, equations (6), (1), and (2) imply 
= in { y (1 - bv 2)[1 - (8/a)] + (82/a)V02 (12) 
Py2 simple mifferentiation I hows thae1 - wvl2 - 82vh t 
and simple differentiation shows that the share of wealth that the 
5 Note that the result does not depend on the specific utility function we assume. In 
general, the expected value of the game to the seller in period 3 will be Ue, and the 
buyer will need to offer him 5U' in period 2. But the optimality of the two-genera- 
tion regime requires I,, = Io/o ' 5U' and the old buyer in period 2 will be left with 
max[O, (IjI) - 5U'] = 0. The result is more general: in any regime, the price the sell- 
ers quote to the oldest generation of buyers with whom they trade must equal their 
whole monetary wealth. 
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seller receives increases with inflation, reaching one when inflation 
reaches 
l 8 6 (13) 
"y 8y2 
In summary, the two-generation regime is an equilibrium if the in- 
flation rate is above the rate at which the old buyers trade their entire 
money holdings for the red good (itr) but below the rate at which this 
is true for the young buyers. Equations (7) and (13) define a0 and y. 
Within this regime, there is a perfect equilibrium such that the red 
good is sold in the first period of negotiations, and its real price 
depends on the type of buyer being addressed by the seller. 
Specifically, 
Po2 = 10 (6) 
and 
Py 2 = I (1 - 5v,2)[1 - (8/ct)] + (82/t)v02 (14) 
1 - 86n2 - 8( Vy2 
Bargaining Equilibrium: The One-Generation Regime 
The derivation of the equilibrium price when it is optimal for the 
seller to address only young customers follows exactly the methodol- 
ogy described above. 
The price, as already mentioned, is given by equation (9): 
pyl = minIyIy(I - + 82xl1 (9) 
where 
xl = vyipy, + (1 - vyl)6x1. (8') 
Notice, however, that the probability that at least one young customer 
will enter the store is now vyI: since the regime has changed, so has the 
velocity of circulation of buyers in the market and therefore the prob- 
ability laws describing meetings between buyers and sellers. We derive 
these probabilities below. 
For equations (9) and (8') to characterize an equilibrium, we re- 
6 Another line of reasoning that leads to the same conclusion is that at the inflation 
rate at which the seller is indifferent between addressing both young and old buyers 
and only young buyers, Po2 = I, = 5xi and xi = x2. Substituting these two conditions in 
eq. (2) for i = y, we obtain Py2 = at the critical rate. 
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quire that, given that everybody is selling only to the young, there be 
no incentive to deviate: 
P01 ? 6xi. (15) 
Again, the old buyers would be willing to trade all their money for the 
red good, implying 
Io ' 8x1. (16) 
Substitution of (16) in (9) leads to 
pl = I. (17) 
But equations (9) and (8') can be solved explicitly: 
r[I -(8/0t)][ 1 - 8( 1 - Vyl)] 8 
pyI = minIly, Iy 1 i/)l 61 - vA)]1 (18) 1 - (1 -VYI) - 62vY1 
and therefore equation (17) is equivalent to 
I 1 - 8 (19) 
The conclusion is that it is optimal for the sellers to trade with only 
young customers whenever condition (19) is satisfied. For such infla- 
tion rates, the young buyers will have to exchange their whole wealth 
for the red good. 
If the probabilities of meeting different types of customers did not 
change across regimes, equations ( 11) and (19) would define a specific 
inflation rate at which the sellers stop considering the old buyers as 
suitable bargaining partners. Since this is not true, the probabilities 
have to be solved explicitly before anything can be said about the 
transition from one regime to the next. In addition, a complete solu- 
tion of the model needs to reconcile the inflation rate with its funda- 
mental cause, the intervention of the bank. 
IV. The Matching Process7 
Let us call 00 the ratio of blue to red consumers born each period, 
00 = nb/nr, where we assume that nb and nr are large. Let Nr be the 
number of red sellers that are active in the market each period, and 
notice that Nr exceeds nr whenever some red sellers have been unable 
to complete a transaction in the past. 
In the one-generation regime, the only buyers searching in the red 
7A similar matching technology, embedding the Rubinstein game in a multiagent 
market, has been studied by Binmore and Herrero (1988). It was first proposed by 
Butters (1977) in a different context. 
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market are the young; hence exactly nb buyers are active. Under the 
assumption that each buyer chooses which seller to visit indepen- 
dently of the other buyers, the probability that a particular seller is 
visited by no customers is [(Nr - 1)INr]lnb, which represents the 
chances that all nb buyers go to one of the other Nr - 1 stores. We may 
rewrite this as 
( 1 - p~j~)fl = exp nb log(n 1 - I ) e 
where 0 is defined to be nb/Nr, and the approximation is valid to order 
(l/Nr).8 Therefore, the probability that a red seller meets a suitable 
buyer is 
v= 1 - (20) 
In a steady state, the number of red sellers born each period must 
just balance the number of sellers who successfully complete a trans- 
action and exit: 
nr = (1 - e-0)Nr.9 (21) 
Dividing equation (21) by nb and rearranging, we obtain 
0 = (1 - e-0)0O. (22) 
To guarantee the existence of a steady state, we require 0o > 1: the 
number of blue consumers being born must be larger than the num- 
ber of red consumers. In any period, the blue buyers leave the red 
market for one of two reasons: either they have concluded their trans- 
action, in which case their exit is matched by an equal number of 
departing sellers, or they have by now become "too poor." This sec- 
ond motivation has no parallel for the sellers, and therefore, for any 
positive inflation rate, they always leave the red market in smaller 
numbers than the blue buyers. If the cohorts being born were of 
equal size, the red market would eventually disappear. 
In the two-generation regime, at any time there are two types of 
buyers searching in the red market: young and old. Each seller pre- 
fers to trade with the young customers, and the probability of meeting 
at least one of them is 
Vy2= 1 - e-01, (23) 
where 0 1 -nlNr and replaces the earlier 0, while vy2 replaces the 
8 See Feller (1972, pp. 88-92) or David and Barton (1962, chap. 14). Since N, and Nb 
are large, the fraction of sellers without a buyer is the same (to order 1 IN,) each period, 
even though the fate of any particular seller remains uncertain. 
9 Notice that eq. (21) is derived under the equilibrium condition that all buyer-seller 
pairs conclude their bargain successfully in the first period and exit the market. 
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earlier vyl; Nr continues to denote the number of red sellers active in 
the market. 
The probability that a seller does not meet any young but meets at 
least one old customer is 
Vo2 = e-01(1 - e-02), (24) 
where 02 is the number of old buyers in the market divided by Nr, and 
the number of old buyers in the market, which we denote by Nbo, 
equals the number of previously unsuccessful young: 
Nbo = nb - (1 - e0')Nr. (25) 
Dividing (25) by Nr, we get 
02 = 01 -1 + e-61. (26) 
The steady-state flow condition in the two-generation regime is 
n, = Nr - Nre - 02e-01, (27) 
which says that the number of red sellers born equals the number who 
meet a suitable customer and exit the market (notice that Nre- 02e -01 is 
the number of unsuccessful sellers). Dividing equation (27) by nb, 
substituting for 02 from equation (26), and rearranging yields 
01 = 0o - 00e'-201 exp(-e-0). (28) 
The existence of a steady state again requires 0o > 1 (nb> nr). 
Comparing equations (22) and (28), for given 00, we find that 01 > 0 
or, substituting this result in equations (20) and (23), vy1 < vy2. For a 
seller, the probability of trading with a young buyer is higher in the 
two- than in the one-generation regime. Intuitively, at lower inflation 
rates, sellers are less "difficult" in their choice of bargaining partners, 
and therefore more sellers leave the market each period, leading to a 
higher ratio of young buyers to sellers. 
V. The Rate of Price Inflation 
Each period, the bank in our economy creates inflation by printing 
new money or, more specifically, by multiplying by ao the money 
holdings of the blue consumers who are going to the red market. 
The rate of price increase cannot in general be a0 since the latter is 
the factor by which only a fraction of the money in the economy is 
multiplied. How large this fraction is, and therefore how large an 
effect the bank exerts on the price level, clearly depends on the veloc- 
ity at which the consumers, and the money, circulate in the two mar- 
kets. The implication is that the relationship between ao and the infla- 
tion rate will be different in the different regimes. 
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The nominal price of the blue good is derived by the condition 
stating that the total revenues from its sale must equal the total 
amount of money spent in the blue market. 
Consider, first, the case in which blue buyers are allowed only one 
period of search: the one-generation regime. In period t + 2, success- 
ful blue consumers born in period t return to the blue market, along 
with the red sellers with whom they have traded; net money holdings 
of these two groups are (aOpbt)(number of successful blue). Recall that 
vy1 is the fraction of red sellers who successfully match with blue 
buyers and that 0 is the ratio of blue born (and searching) to red. 
Then the number of successful blue is just (vy1/0)nb. In addition to 
these two groups, unsuccessful blue agents born in period t also re- 
turn to the blue market at time t + 2; their net money holdings 
are (aOpbt)(number of unsuccessful blue), which equals (aoLbO)El - 
(vyl/0)]nb. No other buyers shop in the blue market in period t + 2; 
hence the equilibrium condition equating nominal supply and de- 
mand is 
nbPbt+2 = OOPbt( )fnb + OLOPbt( 1 
I 
Vnb 
Simplifying, we get Pbt+ 2 = OtOPbt or 
a2 = cto. (29) 
Equation (29) could have been derived directly by noticing that in this 
regime, for each dollar that leaves the blue market at t, a0 must come 
back at t + 2, regardless of how many transactions have been success- 
ful in the red market. 
In the two-generation regime, the procedure is identical. The 
buyers of the blue good at time t + 2 are the blue consumers who, 
born at t, have been successful in their first search, and their red 
partners; the blue consumers who, born at t - 1, have been successful 
in their second search, and their red partners; and the unsuccessful 
blue agents born at t - 1. The sum of their money holdings is given 
by 
IaoPbt 0)nb + (LOPbt-I ( )nb + aOPbt( II ( y2 -y 0 )b 
which leads to the equilibrium condition 
Pbt?+2 = ao0Pbt( 0 + 01OPbt-I( - 0 ( y ) y 
or 
(3 = loayo ) + o(+ 1 - ) (30) 
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We conclude this discussion with two observations. First, nominal 
prices in the red market also rise at the rate a, as can be seen by 
comparing buyers in periods t and t + 1: young buyers in t + I hold a 
times as much money as young in t, second-generation buyers in t + 1 
hold a times what second-generation buyers hold in t, and so forth. 
Second, as inflation rises and search is reduced, the velocity of 
circulation of money increases since blue buyers wait less time before 
spending their cash balances. It can be shown that a given percentage 
increase in the money holdings of the blue consumers (o0) has a larger 
effect on inflation in the one-generation regime than it does in the 
two-generation case. (As will become clear below, this property holds 
generally, for any [k - 1]- and k-generation regimes.) Note that this 
result, one of the classical assumptions of all hyperinflation models, is 
here derived endogenously, as transactions respond to inflation. Of 
course, within each regime, the velocity of circulation of money is 
constant, as is the amount of real money in the economy. 
VI. Transition from the Two-Generation to the 
One-Generation Regime 
For given 8 and 00, the levels of inflation at which the two-generation 
regime ends and the one-generation regime begins are given by equa- 
tions (11) and (19): 
~1-6 1-6 
6vy2 6vy 1 
Recalling that a- 1 + -rr, we let aU2 and oLl denote the points at 
which these two inequalities become equalities; thus UU2 is the upper 
edge of the two-generation case and OtLl the lower edge of the one- 
generation case. Solution of the matching process has demonstrated 
that vy2 exceeds vyl, which implies that oU2 is less than atLI. The situa- 
tion is further complicated, however, by the fact that a depends on a0 
differently in the two regimes. Letting a1, and a2 represent a in the 
one- and two-generation regimes, we have seen that a1 exceeds t2 for 
any given a0 and that a2 depends on 00, whereas a1 does not. 
Figure 1 depicts the relationship between a0 and a across the two 
regimes. When Oo is near one, vy2 is significantly above vyl; as a result, 
the "probability effect" dominates, and the at0 at which CXU2 is realized 
does fall short of the a0 at which aLL is realized. When 00 is large, 
however, the seller's chances of meeting a young buyer are high and 
do not diminish much between the two regimes; hence vy1 and vy2 are 
similar, and the "velocity effect" that relates a to a0 dominates, push- 
ing the a0 corresponding to t U2 above the at0 corresponding to OaLl. 
For low 00, a "mixed-strategy" equilibrium will emerge from ox0 
between point A and point B. In this region a fraction Q of sellers talk 
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FIG. 1 -Transition between the two- and one-generation regimes 
to the young buyers only, and a fraction 1 - Q to both generations. 
When a0 is at the low end of this region, Q is near zero, and it 
increases steadily to one at the upper edge. For each a0, Q is such that 
expected utilities to the two types of sellers are equal.'0 
For high 00, a "multiple-equilibria" region emerges. For a0 between 
point B and point C, there are two possibilities: either all sellers talk to 
both generations of buyers or all sellers talk to only one generation. 
Both possibilities are equilibria. If all other sellers talk to both genera- 
tions, a becomes a2, which is less than aU2; hence it is a dominant 
strategy for a particular seller to talk to both generations as well. If all 
others talk only to the young, then a becomes al, which exceeds aLI, 
so that a dominant strategy is to talk to only the young. 
Presumably some 0* exists at which aU2 equals aLl. We have not 
10 For each ao0 within the mixed-strategy regime, the fraction 0 of sellers who talk to 
both generations is found as the fixed point of the following mappings: each 0 maps 
into a seller's probabilities of meeting the young or old buyers; in turn these probabili- 
ties map into (x, prices and expected utilities. If the expected utility of those sellers who 
talk only to young is, e.g., above the expected utility of those who talk to both genera- 
tions, fl is lowered, but this lowers the probability of meeting a young customer while it 
raises the probability of meeting an old, causing a readjustment in expected utilities. 
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sought to determine this 0*, but instead have simulated four different 
values of 00: 1 .01, 1. 10, 2.00, and 10.0. Of these, 1.01 and 1.10 possess 
mixed-strategy regions, and 2.00 and 10.0 multiple equilibria. 
VII. Expected Utility in the One- and 
Two-Generation Regimes 
We complete our analysis of the one- and two-generation regimes by 
calculating the expected utility of the red and blue consumers. 
Let us first examine the expected utility at birth of a red seller. 
Within the two-generation regime, it can be seen directly that it in- 
creases with a: 
EUr2 = f{(py2Vy2 + Po2vo2)[1 + (1 -Vy2 - Vo2) 
+ 82(l - Vy2 - Vo2 )2 + ..I} 
The red seller will trade immediately if either a young or an old buyer 
enters his store, and it will then take him one period to convert his 
earnings into units of blue good. If he does not trade in the first 
period-with probability (1 - Vy2- vo2)-he will have to wait longer; 
longer still if he is again unlucky in the second period-with probabil- 
ity (1 - Vy2 - vo2)2 -and so forth. The expected utility converges to 
EUr2 = (86/)(Py2vy2 + Po2Vo2) (31) 
1 - 6(1 - Vy2 - Vo2) 
which increases in the bargaining prices. 
Similarly, in the mixed-strategy (if one exists) and one-generation 
regime, the red expected utility equals 
EUri = (6/at) vYI (ao/t) (2 1 - 6(1 - v )' (32) 
where it should be recalled that pyl equals Iy. In the one-generation 
regime, E Ur is constant and simplifies to vy lI/1 -8 (1 -vy 1)] since cto 
equals t2. 
When the two regimes are compared, the two factors working in 
opposite directions are easily identified. On one hand, py is higher in 
the one-generation regime, and this tends to increase EUri relative to 
EUr2. On the other, the probability of successful trade in any period is 
lower since old buyers are disregarded and the probability of meeting 
a young blue customer is reduced. This tends to reduce EUri. 
To explore the question of red utility further, we have simulated 
the economy at the 00 values of 1.01, 1.10, 2.00, and 10.0, as men- 
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tioned above. " Figure 2 illustrates our findings for the representative 
case 00 equal to 1.10 and the three 8 values of .90, .95, and .99. In all 
three cases, the red seller's expected utility is always lower in the one- 
generation regime. Connecting the two regimes is a region of mixed 
strategy, in which the utility declines as the probability vy1 falls. 
The result was confirmed in the simulations with the other three 00 
values; since they cover a very wide range, we would suggest that the 
result is general. For the lower 00 values, in which the two regimes are 
connected by a region of mixed strategy, we conclude that, within this 
region, red expected utility falls with a0. For higher 00, the two re- 
gimes overlap in a region of multiple equilibria, and utility depends 
on which equilibrium emerges. The two-generation equilibrium dom- 
inates. 
The expected utility of the blue consumers reflects the same ambi- 
guity. The intuition is simple: as the ratio of young buyers to sellers in 
the market decreases, moving from the two-generation to the one- 
generation regime, the probability of purchasing the red good during 
the first search period rises. This positive effect is, of course, the 
mirror image of the lower probability of successful trade for the red 
seller. However, offsetting this is the fact that the real price of the red 
good becomes higher with inflation. 
For a blue buyer, the probability of being chosen as a bargaining 
1 To provide a reference framework, we can calculate the utility of the agents in the 
case of zero inflation. The first observation is that, in this case, both buyers and sellers 
leave the market only after a successful transaction, which implies the steady-state 
conditions nb/n, = 1 and Nb/N, = 1. For a seller, the probability of having at least one 
buyer in the first period is (1 - e- '), of having at least one buyer in the second period 
and none in the first is e-1(1 e -1), etc. In addition, all buyers in the market are 
identical, and when two bargaining partners meet, they share the real money holdings 
of the buyer according to the partition [1/(1 + 5), 8/(1 + 5)] (the Rubinstein solution). 
It is then straightforward to derive 
8(i 1) ,F 448 if 8 = .9 
EU, ( = -473 if 8= 95 
(1 + 8)(1 - 5) L.495 if 8 = .99, 
83 ( - - F 1) .363 ifS 
= .9 
EU, = ~( = .427 ifS8 = .95 
(1 + 5)(1 - 5e-) .485 if 8 = .99. 
As expected, at zero inflation the differences in the utilities of buyers and sellers simply 
reflect the imposed, and uninteresting, differences in the order and timing of their 
moves, and disappear as the discount rate goes to one (EU, = EU, -* .5 as 8 -* 1). The 
extra period required by blue consumers to complete their life cycle and the seller's 
advantage of quoting the first price in the bargaining game account for the 82 term. 
This result requires 00 = 1 and therefore is not immediately comparable to the values 
obtained in the simulations (since the presence of inflation requires a higher 00). In 
general, increasing Oo favors the sellers and hurts the buyers, by its effect on matching 
probabilities. 
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FIG. 2.-Expected utilities across the one- and two-generation regimes 
partner is easily derived: it must equal the number of successful 
buyers of one's generation (identical to the number of red sellers 
meeting at least one customer of the given age), divided by the overall 
number of buyers of that generation in the market. That is, the prob- 
ability of being chosen while belonging to the ith generation in the 
k-generation regime is Vik/Oz. We can immediately verify that while 
Vyl < Vy2, Vyl/0 > Vy2/01O 
Substituting these probabilities in the blue utility function, we get 
EUb2 = ve2 52(I~ - + ( _ VY2 _ ___ 83Io ) 
01 Py) i 01 02 ot33 
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EUbl = (i _ (82 -A). (34) 
Let us call A* the minimum value of A that supports the described 
pure strategy equilibria for the two- and one-generation cases, where 
a blue agent is allowed the alternative to consume only on the blue 
market, immediately and without going to the bank (U = 1 - A). 
Simulation results (for Oo = 1. 10) indicate that with A > A* and any 8, 
the expected utility of the blue consumers falls across regimes as in- 
flation increases if A is sufficiently large (i.e., A > 2). In addition, 
the higher is 8, the closer the critical A is to A*, converging to A* for 
8 = .99, the most relevant case. In other words, if the punishment 
from not purchasing the red good is high enough, the probability 
effect does not compensate the blue buyers for the loss in bargaining 
power deriving from the higher inflation rate. The final result is an 
overall welfare loss. 
VIII. Solution of the General Case 
While we have devoted most of our attention to a detailed exposition 
of the one- and two-generation regimes, our analysis extends to the 
general case of k generations of buyers. Presumably as xoo falls toward 
one, blue buyers are willing to search more periods in the red market. 
We would expect the price paid by the youngest buyers in the market, 
P1k, to fall as oto falls within a regime and also to fall as k rises. In fact, 
in the limit as xoo approaches one and k becomes very large, Plk should 
approach the Rubinstein solution. More uncertainty attaches to the 
behavior of expected utility. For large enough A, we expect blue 
buyers to become better off as xoo falls and k rises, but the fate of the 
red sellers is unclear: lower prices as oto falls will diminish their utility 
within a regime, but higher probabilities of meeting eligible buyers 
may increase their utility across regimes, as was found to be true in a 
comparison of the one- and two-generation regimes. 
To derive the equilibrium bargaining prices, we carry over the 
earlier analysis, with one important modification. In the one- and two- 
generation cases, a seller who fails to reach agreement with a buyer by 
the third period will prefer to wait rather than continue talking to that 
buyer. By contrast, in the k-generation case, a seller who has matched 
with a buyer of generation k - 2 or less will be willing to continue 
talking to that buyer in period 3 since the buyer is no older than k 
generations. This affects the original bargain because the seller's ex- 
pected third-period price is changed to reflect the fact that, off equi- 
librium, he will always have someone to talk to in period 3. 
The equilibrium prices solve k simultaneous equations, each ob- 
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tained from a bargaining analysis that matches a representative seller 
against a buyer of a particular age. Let us define as xk the expected 
price to the seller in the third period, when he has matched with an 
ith-generation buyer. For i equal to k or k - 1, 
k 
X -k I = (35) 
1I - 6Vnk 
where vnk = 1 - Vlk- . -vkk. For i less than k- 1, 
i+1 + 1 
Xtk = >1 Pjk9Vf + (i Vik)P(i+2)k, (36) 
j=l j=l 
where the last term reflects the fact that the seller is always free to 
rematch with his current partner in period 3 if no one younger ar- 
rives. The standard analysis then yields 
Pik = min[ii(i - 0?) + 82xik i = 1, .. . , k, (37) 
which is a linear simultaneous system in the pik's. 
The kth regime is an equilibrium for all ao and ak such that (i) at the 
lower boundary pkk 2 Ik and (ii) at the upper boundary p(k - l)k ' I(k - 1) 
a direct analogue of the equilibrium conditions imposed earlier. 
We have not been able to characterize the solution to (37) as com- 
pletely as its specific one- and two-generation versions. We suspect, 
however, that within a regime all prices are nondecreasing in a (and 
coo) and that the younger a buyer is when he matches, the higher his 
utility-the "returns to search" result. 
The matching probabilities can be readily derived by extending the 
logic applied to the one- and two-generation regimes. Continue to let 
Nr denote the number of active sellers and 01 the ratio of young 
buyers to Nr (01 nb/Nr). It is not hard to show that O0, the ratio of 
buyers of thejth generation to Nr, and V>k, the probability that a seller 
talks to a jth-generation buyer, satisfy the following recursive rela- 
tionships: 
O1+?1 = O - Vjk, (38) 
V(j+1)k = Vjke (1 - e-0+) 3 
1 - e-0) 
and that the steady-state flow condition equating entry and exit of red 
sellers is given by 
k 
nr = Nr -NrL ep( A Y )|40 
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or, if we divide by nb and rearrange, 
k 
01 = o- 0o[exp(- 2 "i)] (41) 
To solve for the 0's and v's, we can substitute from (38) and (39) into 
(41). 
By extending previous results, we can also derive the relationship 
between a1k (inflation in the kth regime) and- a0. Aggregate money 
holdings in the blue market in period t + k are 
tOPbt+k-2( ok )fb + a0Pbt+k-3( ok nb + 
k 
+ aoPbt (- I )nb + aOPbt - I Vk) 
where Vik is the fraction of red sellers who, in the k-generation regime, 
successfully match with blue buyers of the ith generation. Equating 
nominal supply of and demand for the blue good, we obtain 
k 
k( k- o ?( oko ) + * + to(1 - AI--). (42) 
The generalized versions of the expected utilities follow directly 
from the previous section: 
k 
(6/la) E PikVik 
E Urk = k ' (43) 
I ( Vik) 
k-1 i+ (b) / kI 8k+1 A). 
EUbk Vi= 
S +I 
pi- ) + I41- VX a -k A (44) 
We have simulated our economy with the four 00 values 1.01, 1.10, 
2.00, and 10.0 discussed earlier to cover lower a0 and higher k values. 
One important result has emerged: the red seller's expected utility 
has an interior maximum at a value of k between two and eight (de- 
pending on 00, and higher for lower 00). That is, there is a range of in- 
flation rates that maximizes the red seller's welfare (see fig. 3). 
IX. Conclusions 
This paper examines distributional effects and welfare costs of infla- 
tion by focusing on the organization of exchange. More specifically, 
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FIG. 3.-Expected utility of the red sellers across many generations (0o = 1.10, 8 = .95) 
we concentrate on the different bargaining powers associated with 
different roles in transactions, and by emphasizing the importance of 
time, we allow the trading technology to respond to the increase in 
nominal values. 
The framework lends itself to a number of worthwhile extensions. 
First of all, the model could be used to study the effect of inflation 
on the adoption of different trading technologies. Suppose that 
agents were born with an endowment of labor that could be employed 
in producing either a blue or a red good. As inflation increases, en- 
try in the decentralized sector would rise, and one-to-one bargain- 
ing would become more widespread. However, this would negatively 
affect the probabilities of sale. The final equilibrium, if one ex- 
ists, would presumably lead to the conclusion common to much anec- 
dotal evidence that inflation reduces efficiency by decentralizing ex- 
changes. 
A second interesting question concerns the optimal switch to a con- 
stant-value currency unit. Even if strictly defined barter Were ex- 
cluded (e.g., by variety in production and specific preferences in con- 
sumption), still at high inflation there will be strong incentives toward 
adopting a stable exchange unit: foreign exchange, if available, gold, 
or a specific good. Suppose that each agent had to sell his endowment 
through a bargaining game and then to purchase his consumption 
again through bargaining. Then inflation would play in his favor in 
the first stage but against him in the second. Whether, and when, the 
economy would adopt a stable means of exchange would depend on 
the relative force of these two opposite effects. 
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In both these extensions, the government should be allowed a more 
active role than the one played in this paper. 
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